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Abstract
Although FDI have been at the forefront of economic debate since
a long time, economists have not yet developed a unied framework
for their investigation. In this paper, we put forward the idea that an
essential point to analyze FDI concerns their underpinning motives.
Motives are at the core of FDI and FDI are only but one of dierent
alternative means for rms to grasp an opportunity in a foreign country.
We discuss the factors that shape the set of available alternatives and
analyze those aecting the decision to engage in FDI (internalisation
determinants), along with those inuencing their localisation (locali-
sation determinants). Starting from Dunning (1993) we put forward
a revised taxonomy of FDI motives consistent with this framework {
resource seeking, market seeking and non-marketable asset seeking. In
order to show its practical implications, we survey common empirical
issues on FDI showing how our analysis can shed light on seemingly
contradictory empirical results.
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1 Introduction
Foreign Direct Investments (henceforth FDI) have been treated by dierent
streams of literature { management studies, international trade theory, eco-
nomics of innovation, etc. { and under many perspectives. Notwithstanding,
a unied analytical framework of the primitive motives underlying FDI deci-
sions is still missing. Indeed, FDI motivations have been rarely considered
as factors that may aect determinants and consequences of FDI. Among
the exceptions, Dunning's (1993) contribution, aimed at providing a unied
framework for their analysis, is worth mentioning. This work has been the
starting point of almost all the following elaboration on the issue.
Nevertheless, Dunning's taxonomy of FDI motives { market seeking,
resource seeking, eciency seeking and strategic asset seeking { is not always
internally consistent and we believe there is room for further improvement.
The main drawbacks are partly due to its strong commitment to the OLI
paradigm (Dunning, 1993), where there is only an ex-post analysis in terms of
motives and no consideration of the strategies alternative to FDI compatible
with the same underlying motive.
In fact, the motivations behind rms' decisions to grasp an opportunity
outside the home country have impacts both on: (i) the actual chosen
means { FDI vs. alternative means suitable for the \cherry picking" strategy
{ (internalisation determinants); and (ii) the choice of the host country
(localisation determinants). These two logically distinct steps are always
entailed and the nal outcome is not necessarily FDI. We identify and analyze
the factors inuencing FDI choice among the relevant alternatives, together
with those aecting the decision of where to locate the activity. We then
put forward a new taxonomy of FDI motives consistent with this framework
{ resource seeking, market seeking and non-marketable asset seeking { and
discuss at some length its premises and implications.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the logical
steps entailed in rms' international strategies, showing why the motives
underlying such strategies are essential in order to grasp eects and deter-
minants of FDI. Section 3 critically reviews the literature on FDI motives,
emphasising the need of a unied analytical framework. In Section 4, we
present our revised taxonomy. In order to show its strong practical impli-
cations, in Section 5 we survey some of the empirical issues, showing how
the seemingly contradictory results of most of the studies can be actually
resolved within our framework. Finally, Section 6 concludes summing up the
main results.
22 A useful logical framework to analyze rms'
international strategies
Despite all along the paper our main research interest will lie in rms'
decision to conduct FDI, in the present Section we step back for a while
and concentrate on the general choice of rms to carry out an \international
strategy". In some cases, this strategy can lead to an FDI but, in others,
other actions (joint venture, outsourcing, etc.) are in fact implemented. The
analysis of this process should be preliminary to any analysis of FDI and
therefore we put forward a useful logical decomposition of it.
In general terms, the rms' decision making process involved in carrying
out an \international strategy" can be depicted as follows. First, rms
identify an opportunity which can be grasped outside the home country. It
is worth noting that the act of catching the opportunity is the nal aim of
each rm's action.
Having identied the opportunity, a twofold decision is logically implied
in the \cherry picking" strategy:
i) Choice among the relevant alternatives: A rst choice has to be made
among a set of relevant alternatives. These are all the available dierent
means the rm can exploit in order to seize the opportunity and they
strongly depend on the kind of opportunity at stake. For instance, if
the main interest for the company is to get access to a foreign market,
then both FDI, exports and patent licenses are alternative ways to take
advantage of it. On the contrary, if a rm wants to prot from low cost
foreign labour, it can resort to either FDI or international outsourcing.
Obviously, motives underlying the decision process, e.g. cheap labour or
market share, not only aect the basket of alternatives available but also
the way factors (e.g. exchange rate or infrastructure) drive the decision
among the alternatives. Thus, because we are interested in studying the
factors spurring rms to choose FDI, we dene them as internalisation
determinants.1
ii) Location choice: There is a second choice involved in the \cherry picking"
strategy: the choice related to the location. Assuming that, at the pre-
vious stage, the rm decided to resort to FDI as the relevant alternative
to take advantage of a foreign market, the problem of choosing the host
country might still be unsolved. We need to underline that, even in this
case, the factors aecting such location choice, the so called localisation
1We have drawn this term from the theory of the rm, even though with a dierent
meaning. As a matter of fact, we do not refer to in a strict sense to the way the rm
sets its boundaries (make or buy decision) as it is done in most of the studies (e.g. Coase,
1937; Williamson, 1985) and, especially, in Dunning's (1977) OLI paradigm. Instead, our
denition applies to the possible alternatives the same has in order to get access to a
foreign country.
3determinants, strongly depends on the kind of opportunity the rm
wants to grasp.
Although we have identied the process as made up of two logically
distinct steps, these can be eectively reversed at times, other times be
coexisting or even lacking. Notwithstanding, they should be kept analytically
distinct as the factors inuencing them can be dierent and with diverse
impacts.
To sum up, we put forward the idea that any proposed classication of
FDI is useful only when it is based on the underpinning motives. In fact,
a systemic treatment of FDI motives is needed because they turn out to
aect two related sets of issues. Firstly, the determinants of FDI activity.2
Under this heading we consider both internalisation determinants { factors
inuencing the probability of choosing FDI among the set of alternative
means3 { and localisation determinants { factors aecting the choice of the
country in which the rm actually invests. Secondly, motives aect the eects
of FDI both in the host and home country. In particular, as we will argue
later, motives turn out to aect levels and patterns of international trade,
FDI contribution to economic development and the amount and direction
of productivity spill-overs. As a matter of fact, studying FDI determinants
without taking into account motives can lead to estimates that are either
non signicant or highly-dependent on the sample of countries that has been
chosen.
3 A critical review of the literature on FDI
motives
The issue of FDI motives has not been usually treated as a autonomous
eld of study and it has crossed dierent streams of economic literature:
international business, international trade theory and the theory of the rm.
The most cited taxonomy of FDI motives is the one put forward by Dunning
(1993) and built upon his famous OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1977).4 This
taxonomy distinguishes four kinds of FDI:
2In line with the past literature, determinants can be dened as \factors that drive FDI
behaviour" (Blonigen, 2005, p.383).
3For the sake of clarity, it must be stressed that, even when the same alternative is
selected for two dierent orders of reasons, factors inuencing the choice of this specic
alternative are essentially dierent. Indeed, the underpinning motives are likely to have a
dierent impact on the direction of the eect or on the characteristic of the same alternative.
4According to Dunning, this paradigm should explain why (ownership), where (location)
and how (internalisation) a rm becomes multinational. The ownership advantage is
the mobile asset (e.g. a patent or a trademark) the rm owns or controls; the location
advantage is the exploitation of this asset abroad; the internalisation advantage is the
power to directly control the exploitation itself.
4i) Resource seeking: the main motive of the rm is the acquisition of
particular resources not available at home (natural resources or raw
materials) or available at a higher cost (unskilled cheap labour);
ii) Market seeking: rms invest abroad to prot from foreign markets.
Various reasons can actually lead to this choice: the need to follow
suppliers or customers that have built foreign production facilities; to
adapt goods to local needs or tastes; to avoid the costs of serving a
market from distance; to have a physical presence on the market in order
to discourage potential competitors.
These two categories have been the most cited and debated. In in-
ternational trade models, they are referred to as respectively vertical and
horizontal FDI. In the early analysis by Markusen (1984), the latter derive
from the will of avoiding transportation costs or jump taris. In particular,
rms must decide whether to set up a foreign plant or to serve the market via
exports (see also Horstmann, 1992; Brainard, 1997; Markusen and Venables,
1998, 2000). As for the former, they aim at relocating part of the production
chain abroad in order to gain from the lower cost of production factors or
to gain control over local resources (see, among the others, Helpman, 1984;
Slaughter, 2003). These insights have been developed further in the so called
\knowledge capital model" by Markusen and Maskus (2002), where a formal
model with both motives is tested, and in models like Yeaple (2003) and
Grossman et al. (2006), that analyse more complex strategies of international
integration with more than two stages of production. Notwithstanding, as
for both vertical and horizontal FDI, despite the narrower perspective of
analysis and the stronger focus on cost dierentials, there is a substantial
overlapping with Dunning's distinction of resource vs. market seeking FDI.
The third item of the taxonomy is dened by Dunning as:
iii) Eciency seeking: FDI that occur when: (i) rms \take advantage of
dierences in the availability and costs of traditional factor endowments
in dierent countries"; or (ii) they \take advantage of the economies
of scale and scope and of dierences in consumer tastes and supply
capabilities" (Dunning, 1993, p.60).
Economists have sometimes used this category by just referring to this
blurred denition. Some authors consider this case very close to the one of
resource seeking, because it can be regarded as a way to fragment production,
thus gaining from the cheap cost of labour in less developed countries (e.g.
Eckel, 2003; Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2002). Other authors instead emphasise
the possible gains from common dispersed activities by exploiting economies
of scale and scope, given that rms can diversify their assets (e.g. Bevan and
Estrin, 2000; Campos and Kinoshita, 2003; Kinoshita and Campos, 2004).
5Being it as it may, it is important to note that both these uses do not add
further motives to market and resource seeking.
In all the cases analysed so far, FDI can generate economic rents through
the exploitation of some rms' specic asset. These are usually technological
assets produced by R&D investments that the headquarters of the multina-
tional enterprises (henceforth MNE) transfer to the subsidiaries (Cantwell,
1989; Pearce, 1999). For this reason, they are usually called asset exploiting
FDI (Narula and Marin, 2005).5
The last category Dunning singles out is:
iv) Strategic asset seeking: FDI aim at acquiring a new technological base,
rather than exploiting an existing asset.
This last category does not look perfectly consistent with Dunning's
(1977) OLI paradigm. Indeed, in this case there is no previous advantage of
the rm investing abroad. This points out that the analysis of motives has
not guided the building of the OLI paradigm and that FDI motives are likely
to have been only ex-post determined. Moreover, although the denition
does not refer to any explicit \strategic" choice, Dunning describes various
situations in which, rather than pure asset seeking, strategic considerations
are the dominant motives. This proves that the present category is a sort of
residual item in which Dunning puts all the cases that do not t well with
the previous three classes.6
Following the distinction made by Cantwell and Mudambi (2005) and
leaving aside the strategic considerations, FDI belonging to this fourth group
are classied under the heading of asset seeking.7 This motive has recently
attracted a considerable body of theoretical and empirical literature, that
can be divided in two strands. The rst analyses the international location of
R&D (e.g. Cantwell, 1995; Cantwell and Janne, 1999). Indeed, as argued by
Kumar (2001), if one assumes localised knowledge spill-overs, rms engaging
in FDI can actually tap into the capabilities available in the host country by
locating subsidiaries close to the local leading centres of R&D (Pearce, 1999;
Niosi, 1999). The second strand deals instead with the issue of absorbing
technology, where the case of MNE \without advantages" is considered
5Equivalent expressions are: home base exploiting (Kuemmerle, 1999) and competence
exploiting (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005).
6In fact, Dunning (1993) analyses also other minor motives he is not able to insert in any
of the four categories previously described. They are classied into three groups: (i) escape
investments, i.e. investments made \to escape restrictive legislation or macro-organizational
policies by home governments"; (ii) support investment, needed to \support activities of
the rest of the enterprise of which they are part" (1993, p.61); and (iii) passive investments,
investments closer to portfolio investments, although sharing with FDI some characters of
active involvement in rm management.
7Equivalent expressions are: home-base augmenting (Kuemmerle, 1999) and competence
creating (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005).
6(Fosfuri and Motta, 1999; Siotis, 1999).8 Finally, there is also a number of
econometric studies testing the asset seeking hypothesis (see, among the
others, Kogut and Chang, 1991; Neven and Siotis, 1996; VanPottelsberghe
and Lichtenberg, 2001).
But motives have been considered also within the literature on knowledge
and productivity spill-overs, where FDI are classied in technology exploita-
tion and technology sourcing and sectorial R&D intensity has been used to
test for the possibility of reversed spillover eects (Drield and Love, 2002,
2007).9
A last stream of literature that has incidentally dealt with FDI motives
is the one on location determinants of FDI. In these analysis, the motives
are examined ex-post by considering whether certain features of the country
might be related to the attraction of FDI characterised by particular motives.
Thus, for instance, a rise in market dimension has been associated with a rise
in market seeking FDI inows (Brainard, 1997; Markusen and Maskus, 2002).
And the same kind of reasoning has been followed for resource seeking (Carr
and Maskus, 2001) as well as eciency or asset seeking FDI (Nunnenkamp
and Spatz, 2002).
4 A modied motive-based classication of FDI
The analysis of the previous Section has showed the partial and fragmented
way the literature has dealt with FDI motives so far. To the best of our
knowledge, Dunning's (1993) analysis is the only systematic taxonomy and it
is therefore our starting point. Notwithstanding, the modied version of this
taxonomy we propose here is not based on the OLI paradigm, but it comes
from the logical steps entailed by rms' international strategies identied and
discussed in Section 2. Thus, despite some seemingly apparent similarities,
the conceptual framework is radically dierent.
We classify FDI according to their motives in: resource seeking, market
seeking and non marketable asset seeking. In what follows, for each of
these items, we discuss the denition and the alternative means the rm
has in hand for the cherry picking strategy, along with internalisation and
localisation determinants. Table 1 summarises the main results.
8Strategic aspects of rms' behaviour are considered instead by Bjorvatn and Eckel
(2006), who analyse entry strategies of lagging and leading rms.
9Within this analytical framework, Drield and Love (2007) also suggest a taxonomy
to disentangle the broad categories of asset exploiting and asset seeking motives by
combining two dierent sets of issues: (i) technology dierences, measured by R&D
intensity dierentials; and (ii) factor costs dierences, measured by units of labour.
74.1 Resource seeking
Following Dunning (1993, 1998), one of the motives for rms to engage in
FDI activity goes under the heading of resource seeking (henceforth RS).
As Dunning puts it, this should include all the cases where enterprises are
\prompted to invest abroad to acquire particular and specic resources at
a lower real cost than could be obtained in their home country (if, indeed,
they are obtainable at all)." (1993, p.56).
Unlike Dunning, we use the term resource to refer to natural scarce
resources and labour, both unskilled and skilled, whereas in Dunning (1993)
the term is referred to natural resources, unskilled labour and technological
and managerial capabilities. It is important to grasp such dierences. On
the one side, we do not include technological and managerial capabilities. As
we will see later, for the present aim such assets should be more properly
viewed as non marketable assets, because they are relevant in aecting FDI
decisions only as far as they cannot be directly transferred by means of
market transactions. On the other side, we include skilled labour in the
present category. Indeed, although FDI aimed at acquiring human capital are
usually considered asset seeking FDI (see, for instance, Zanfei, 2000), and thus
analysed in relative isolation, the fact that workers' skills can be, although
partially, the object of market contracts leads to analogies with the other
cases under the present heading. In fact, although the cases of skilled-labour
seeking FDI can actually show peculiar features in the degree and patterns
of productivity spillover they produce, they show instead characteristics
which are quite similar to those of the remaining cases of this category with
respect to the relevant alternatives as well as the internalisation and location
determinants.
As for the set of the alternative strategies the rm can actually follow, this
does not change when the resource to exploit is a natural physical resource or
unskilled labour, or when it is instead skilled labour. Indeed, in both cases,
in spite of engaging in a FDI, the rm can decide to resort to international
trade in intermediates or international outsourcing.10
10The term outsourcing has been used by economist with slightly dierent meanings.
Someone (e.g. Van Long, 2005) uses it mainly referring to international partnerships, thus
assuming a minimum level of relation durability. Some others utilise it in all the cases in
which rms resort to foreign markets to acquire intermediate inputs (e.g. Feenstra and
Hanson, 1999). In this case, the term is therefore just a synonym of international trade
in intermediate inputs. Finally, some other economists (e.g. Bhagwati et al., 2004) uses
the term outsourcing only referring to the cases in which what it is actually outsourced is
service provision. Sometimes the term is used as a synonym of delocalisation or o-shoring,
especially within the international trade literature (e.g. Hummels et al., 1998; Glass, 2004).
Drawing on, among the others, Amiti and Wei (2006), the meaning of outsourcing
we decided to stick here delimits it with respect to, on the one side, delocalisation or
o-shoring, on the other side, vertical FDI. In particular, we use delocalisation (Leamer,
1996) or o-shoring for referring to the international fragmentation of production stages,
being it due to international outsourcing or vertical FDI. In the latter case, the production
8The analogies still remain with respect to what we called internalisation
determinants. Indeed, in all the resource seeking strategies, no matter if the
resource at stake is actually a natural one or skilled/unskilled labour, the
factors aecting rms' decision to resort to either outsourcing or FDI are
mainly those shaping the boundaries of the rm, that is those inuencing
the \make or buy" decision. In this respect, the results achieved within the
theory of the rm turn out to be particularly useful. We mainly refer to the
transaction costs theory (Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1996) and the theory of
property rights and incomplete contracts (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart
and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995).11
Thus, for instance, according to the former theory the boundaries of the
rms, and thus in the present context the decision to resort to outsourcing
instead of FDI, are mainly aected by the intensity of the so called hold-up
problem and the level of conict among transactors. In particular, there
should be a negative correlation between the lack of fungibility of assets
(asset specicity), and the expected level of outsourcing. Moreover, when
present together with specicity, uncertainty is another factor negatively
correlated with outsourcing.12 In addition, one should take into account the
interrelation of each transaction with all the other exchanges. And, nally,
transaction costs are usually assumed to be positively related with asset
intangibility (e.g. Gonz alez et al., 2000) and this is therefore another factor
positively aecting FDI decision.
According to the theory of property rights and incomplete contracts, rms
instead arise because contracts do not provide for every possible situation
and the ex post allocation of power (or control) associated with ownership,
the so-called residual control rights, is therefore important: rms are the
product of a process of optimal allocation of these residual rights.13 Within
this framework, the conclusion is that we should not expect a monotonic
relation between transaction costs and vertical integration degree, but there
should be a positive relation only between asset complementarity (Hart,
stage goes outside the country but still remains within the boundaries of the rm, whereas
in the former it crosses both the national and the rm boundaries.
11Although in the narrower perspective of general equilibrium models, the integration
between the theory of incomplete contracts and the analysis of international organisation
of production we suggest here is also in Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2005), Antr as and
Helpman (2004) and Grossman et al. (2005).
12As noted by Gonz alez et al. (2000), if no specicity exists, there is no conclusive
argument to expect a denite correlation between uncertainty and outsourcing in the
transaction costs theory.
13In particular, this theory assumes that: contracts are incomplete and this in turn
generates costs associated with ex post ineciencies, re-negotiations and specic investments
in rm relationships; assets are specic; there are variables that, though observable, are
not veriable from outsiders; property rights give residual rights of control on assets, both
material and immaterial, but not on human resources. For a systematic treatment of the
theory see, for instance, Hart (1995).
91995) and vertical integration.14
Finally, also with respect to what we called localisation determinants,
the similarities among all the cases of RS FDI as previously dened are quite
marked. In all these cases, there should be seemingly a negative association
between the country actually chosen for the FDI and the real cost (gross
of duties and taris) of the resource the rm is interested in; a positive
association between the former country and the absolute scarcity of the
resource on a global scale; and a positive association between the country
and the relative productivity of the resource.
4.2 Market seeking
A second motive concerning rms' decisions to engage in FDI activities can
go under the heading of market seeking (henceforth MS). As discussed in
Section 3, this topic has been extensively explored by the literature so far.
The main aim of MS FDI is to exploit a foreign market which is of some
appeal to the rm, in particular by supplying the market of the host country,
or that of adjacent ones, with goods and services.
The main problem underpinning this kind of FDI motive refers to the
fact that foreign market to be exploited is not necessarily the market where
FDI takes place. Indeed, the FDI can be either in a direct form or in an
indirect one. In the rst case, the rm is interested in the exploitation of
the market of the country hosting the FDI while, in the second, the country
where the FDI is directed is just a \platform" from which it is possible to
export to the surrounding area. This distinction between exploitation of the
host country and what in the literature are called export-platform FDI (e.g.
Ekholm et al., 2003) is very important and it must be kept in mind both in
the reminder of the present section and when we will discuss ndings of the
empirical literature (see Section 5).
Under MS, internalisation determinants can be divided in two main sets
of factors: (i) factors inuencing rms' ability to export goods and services
(the issue of tradability); (ii) factors aecting the extent of appropriability
of the results of the production process.
The rst set of factors relate to particular characteristics of the goods
and services, all those that can compromise the possibility of internationally
trading them, as well as to all the dierent costs that hinder trade, hence
inuencing the degree of tradability of nal products.15 According to the
classical model of Buckley and Casson (1981), exports imply lower xed
14There is a recent interesting empirical application by Feenstra and Hanson (2005) that
nds some evidence supporting the existence of a relation between rm outsourcing and
contractual incompleteness in the case of delocalisation in China.
15In general, trade costs can be broadly dened as \all costs incurred in getting a good
to a nal user other than the marginal cost of producing the good itself (Anderson and
van Wincoop, 2004, p.691)".
10costs and higher variable costs compared to FDI. In general, although the
typologies of trade costs are numerous, in this Section we will concentrate
just on some of them, which are deemed as particularly important for the
issue at stake, that is policy barriers and transportation/communication
costs.
As for the former, these are all the restrictions that the foreign market is
likely to impose on its own imports. The typologies of restrictions available
can be distinguished in two main areas. On the one hand, there are direct
import restrictions which act on the overall volume of imports of the host
country. Among these, we nd taris, import quotas, voluntary export
restraints, local content requirements, red-tape barriers and national pro-
curement (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). On the other hand, we have
indirect import restrictions which are put in action by fostering the overall
volume of exports of the host country. In particular, the means available are
principally exports subsidies and export credit subsidies.
All of the above mentioned restrictions are positively correlated with the
likelihood of the rm to take the decision to carry out market-based FDI. In
particular, the rm is likely to decide for FDI as a mean to \jump" over the
restrictions imposed on imports by the host country.
As for transport costs, they can be decomposed in direct and indirect
ones. The former refer to freight charges and relative insurance on the
shipment. The latter include holding, inventory and preparation costs. While
transportation costs have a signicant impact on the level of tradability of
goods, communication costs impact more the extent of tradability of services
(Hummels, 2007). Nevertheless, both of them are positively correlated with
the decision to carry out a MS FDI. For example, think of a rm facing the
decision either to take out an FDI or exporting the products directly to the
host country. The higher the costs of delivering the product are, the more
likely the rm is to invest directly into the country via FDI.
The second set of internalisation determinants pertains to factors inu-
encing the extent of appropriability of the results of the production process,
that is easiness of imitation and patentability issues. The former refers to
the set of factors inuencing the extent of appropriability of the results
of the production process. The more factors other than patents { such
as secrecy, the importance of complementary investments, lead-time and a
steeper learning curve { are able to protect the technology from easy and
quick imitation, the more likely the rm is to invest directly into the host
country.
Easiness of imitation is, in turn, inuenced by the degree of patentability
of a given invention. Both international and national regulations,16 along
16The most important changes in international regulations approved in the last 30 years
are: patentability of new technologies such as software and life sciences discoveries, decrease
of the patentability requirement and higher protection accorded in courts.
11with the eciency of the patent oce, are factors impacting directly on
the possibility for the rm to patent a technology in the host country. The
level of appropriability patent assures grants the rm with a temporary
monopolistic advantage over competitors in the host market, advantage
spurring it to invest directly in the host market. Nevertheless, the same rm
faces a somewhat dierent opportunity, that is the possibility to license the
patented technology. In this case, the rm might decide for an alternative
strategy other than FDI, that is proting from licenses' revenues, leading to
a negative eect on FDI decision. Indeed, the streams of prots coming from
licenses are negatively correlated with MS FDI. We can conclude that the
overall eect is mixed, depending on which of the two eects { positive for
the monopolistic advantage in the host country and negative for the streams
of prots from licenses { overcomes the other.
Once the rst step of the decision process is carried out, and therefore
a MS FDI is chosen as the appropriate means to pick up the opportunity
arisen in a foreign country, then the choice of a location is the subsequent
logical step to be accomplished. When the main aim of the rm is to enter
into the foreign market, localisation determinants should be distinguished
between whether they pertain to the decision to enter exactly the market
where FDI is done and whether the host country is seen more as an export
platform for the markets of neighbouring countries.
In the rst case, a factor driving localisation choices is the size of the host
country market. In other situations the growth rate of the market is more
important than its absolute size. Other important factors are the presence
and intensity of both absolute and comparative advantages. All these factors
aect positively the decision to localise the MS FDI in a certain host country.
In the second case, dierential in characteristics of host country compared
to neighbouring ones are the essential factors inuencing the decision to
direct the FDI in the host country and use it as an export platform. Among
the others, dierences in norms and regulations, together with those in labour
costs taxes are worth stressing.
4.3 Non marketable asset seeking
The last motive for a rm to engage in FDI is the acquisition of assets which
are not directly transferable through market transactions. Such assets are
characterised by the possibility of being exploited only inside the country or in
the \local" context where they are created. Indeed, when this characteristic
is taken to the extreme, if the rm is willing to access the asset, it is forced
to invest in the host country through FDI. We call it non-marketable asset
seeking FDI (henceforth NMAS).17
17It is worth noting that the characteristic of non transferability we are referring to can
be related to both inner features of the asset as well as to its institutional and normative
context. Just to give an example, we may cite the case of Protected Designation of Origin
12To start with, these non transferable assets can be externalities from
agglomeration economies. In this case, the fact of being close to other rms
may play its role in the FDI localisation. In particular, besides the possibility
of better linkages with suppliers and customers and the presence of a valuable
market of specialised labour, technological spillover eects spur rms to locate
close to local rms' clusters. This possibility has been explored by a large
strand of literature, although with dierent approaches, that underlines how
this mechanism occurs (e.g. Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Head, 1995; Barrell
and Pain, 1999); and the crucial role of agglomeration economies has been
emphasised also in the new economic geography (Krugman, 1991; Fujita
et al., 2001). In this sense, FDI and agglomeration economies have already
been linked in the previous literature, but it has not been well pointed out
that the possibility of replicating the same agglomeration economies across
borders might not be feasible because spill-overs can be extremely dependent
upon the \local" context.
Second, non transferable assets can be related to learning aspects and,
in particular, to the access to the organisational capabilities of the rm.
These can be considered a \sticky" resource embedded in particular expertise
and organising principles. They are generated inside the rm and, because
of their high degree of tacitness, they can be hardly communicated and
transferred via market transactions (e.g. Zander and Kogut, 1995). Likewise,
the presence of valuable technological knowledge built upon some local
specic competencies, that are not reproducible in a dierent setting, can
actually represent something that would be lost if transferred across borders.
For these reasons, the complexity of the technology embedded in the local
context needs close contacts with the owners of the technological base in
order to start a process of accumulation.
With respect to the possible strategies which are alternatives to FDI in
this case, they are mainly joint ventures (henceforth JV) and acquisition of
core personnel. As for the former, rms might enter into partnerships with
other rms to have direct access, exploit and absorb the asset into their own
production processes. Indeed, JVs give greater opportunity for technological
collaboration and technological exchange. The other possibility for rms
is having access to the core personnel of the local rm, given that what is
mostly needed is not only the local context where the asset is produced, but
the people who have the skills to replicate its production process.
As far as internalisation determinants are concerned, establishing a JV
will be less likely when the degree of competition in the market is particularly
high. As a matter of fact, when the market is highly competitive the
possibility for the rm to have access to the specic asset considered will be
(PDO), an expression used to describe foodstus that are produced, prepared and processed
in a given location using specic local know-how. The nal goods cannot be compared to
the same nal goods eventually produced with the same characteristics in another country,
because the context in which they would be produced is obviously dierent.
13more dicult if the allied rm is in direct competition with the rm itself
or with other rms that are part of the local market. This is essentially
because the valuable asset will not be easily disclosed to competitors. On the
other side, the greater is the degree of transferability of knowledge through
direct contact, the higher will be the possibility that foreign rms will enter
into the market with a JV. The second alternative considered above is the
international acquisition of the core personnel. In this case, the point is that
the higher the degree of organisational capabilities inside human resources is,
the higher the probability for rms to resort to FDI will be. Indeed, if the
competitive advantage of the rm is not embedded in some key personnel,
but instead diused in the rm's overall organising procedure, in order to
get the assets it would be better to acquire the rm through a M&A rather
then trying to capture the key personnel.
Finally, as for the localisation determinants, rms will choose the loca-
tion according to variables mainly related to the local infrastructure. We
are not referring only to basic infrastructure (such as a reliable transport
system), but also to scientic and high technological infrastructure (like
high-quality telecommunication). In particular, the linkages between the
scientic infrastructure and the markets are of crucial importance. Other
crucial factors are the closeness to the technological frontier of the host
country and the technological gap between the home and the host country.
Indeed, rms engaging in NMAS FDI will choose the country in order to
access technological assets not available elsewhere. Moreover, as stressed in
the literature on absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989), a great
technological gap between countries can impinge on rms' possibility to
absorb this technological knowledge (for a recent empirical application, see
Girma, 2005). Therefore, in this perspective rms are likely to invest in
countries/sectors whose technological knowledge is not too far from their
own knowledge.
4.4 Other motives for FDI
What remains to show is that our classication of the motives underlying
FDI is exhaustive, i.e. it exhausts the motives for a rm to engage in a FDI,
or at least that the motives not included are indeed residual and do not
alter the overall gure. In so doing, in Section 4.4.1 we will analyze what
can be considered the \residual motives" of FDI, whereas in Section 4.4.2
we explain why we decided not to follow Dunning's (1993) taxonomy, thus
considering as separate items neither eciency seeking FDI nor strategic
asset seeking FDI.
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154.4.1 Residual motives
With respect to the residual motives, we think the only cases that cannot be
subsumed in any of the items of our taxonomy are support investments, as
Dunning (1993) terms them, that is FDI whose purpose is mainly \to support
the activities of the rest of the enterprise of which they are part." (1993,
p.61). These are investments which are highly complementary to other kinds
of FDI or outsourcing decisions and, given their inner ancillary nature, they
share the character of the main activity they serve. Examples of support
investments are trade-related investments of rms, i.e. investments done to
manage trade related activities in the host country, such as the purchasing
of intermediate inputs in case of resource seeking strategies. They can also
equally serve a market seeking strategy by helping managing the relevant
information and the network of clients in the target market.
Apart from that, we believe there are no other residual motives left
outside, although we should admit that, given the absence of a clear-cut
division between FDI and portfolio investments, there could be situations in
which the latter share some features with the former. However, we think that
in these cases the short term perspective of such investments tends to prevail.
First of all, no FDI are usually involved in operations of nancial coverage.
Second, when acquired rms are actively managed by \new" owners,18 whose
main aim is actually to gain from short and medium term asset appreciation,
there is no relevant change with respect to the determinants, which remain
those pertaining to portfolio investments.
Finally, It is worth noting that the problem of distinguishing FDI in a
proper sense from speculative foreign investments in real estate, i.e. invest-
ments done to gain from the appreciation in land and property prices, is
instead mainly related to statistical problems. Indeed, although in theory
these investments are not FDI because of their short term perspective, they
are nevertheless included in direct investments in national accounts data and
cannot be easily distinguished.
4.4.2 What remains outside?
We now explain why we left out some of Dunning's categories. First of
all, we do not use the eciency seeking category. Indeed, in line with the
logical framework we have identied, eciency seeking FDI do not represent
another mean to reach the goal of exploiting an opportunity in another
country. In Dunning's (1993) original analysis as well as in his subsequent
studies (1998; 2000), the presence of this category is justied by the presence
of economies of scale and scope. Indeed, a rm can actually invest abroad
through FDI, even though there is an identical rm performing the same
functions, whenever there is the possibility to gain from economies of scale and
18These cases are termed passive investments by Dunning (1993).
16scope coming from xed (indivisible) administrative costs. Notwithstanding,
following our logical process, this category does not identify new motives. In
fact, eciency seeking should discriminate only on the possibility of doing
outsourcing instead of FDI and this is actually an internalisation choice.19
We have struck out also strategic asset seeking FDI. As already argued,
this is a residual category which groups FDI not easily explainable within
the OLI paradigm. The asset the rm is seeking is not properly identied
and the strategic character of the motives, claimed by Dunning as a distinct
feature of such category, may be in other categories as well. According to
our working hypothesis, this strategic character is indeed the prerequisite of
all FDI decisions. Dunning (1998, 2000) acknowledges the multiple changes
MNEs' activities have undergone because of globalisation, that have force
them to rise their asset augmenting activities. However, he does not consider
this to be a motive that may generate FDI. And even the new strand of
literature on technology sourcing surveyed in Section 3, although clearly
takes into account this possibility, does not properly examine the specicity
of the asset the rm is trying to acquire. Indeed, it is usually roughly argued
that the rm should locate subsidiaries close to rms belonging to innovative
sectors or clusters, in order to prot from knowledge spillover. Thus, this
literature disregards the analysis of the mechanisms through which the asset
is acquired and they turn out to be crucial for the choice of FDI as the actual
international strategy.
5 How motives aect determinants of FDI
decision
In the present Section, we will consider the main determinants of FDI decision
addressed by the empirical literature. In particular, we will discuss the eects
of exchange rates, trade ows and trade barriers (Blonigen, 2005) on the
extent and direction of FDI. We add up to this list by considering two
main factors that have drawn the attention of the literature in recent years:
institutions and localised knowledge spill-overs. All along the section, most of
the eort will be put on showing how our taxonomy of FDI motives is able to
better clarify the direction of the eects produced by a certain determinant
on the choice and the level of FDI.
As a matter of fact, up to now no denite result has been reached on these
issues. By identifying FDI on the basis of their driving motives, we show
how to improve our understanding of how selected determinants inuence
the direction and extent of FDI activity. At the end of the Section, Table 2
summarises the main results.
19As a matter of fact, as pointed out in the previous Sections, in empirical studies
eciency seeking FDI are usually subsumed under market or resource seeking FDI.
175.1 Exchange rates
Exchange rates are surely one the most studied FDI determinants. The liter-
ature has considered three dierent issues: volatility, levels and expectations.
This paragraph considers the eects of exchange rate, here conceived as
the host country currency over the home country currency, on the amount of
inward FDI at the country level.
With respect to the extent of exchange rate volatility, both positive
(Cushman, 1985; Goldberg and Kolstad, 1995) and negative eects on the
amount of inward FDI (Urata and Kawai, 2000; B enassy-Qu er e et al., 2001)
have been found, thus pointing out a blurred eect of exchange rate volatility
on FDI decision. Notwithstanding, through the lens of our taxonomy, it
is possible to get more precise insights on the grounds of the dierent
motives underpinning FDI decision. When FDI is RS, we expect a positive
relationship between exchange rate volatility and FDI to arise. In this case,
outsourcing is the relevant alternative to FDI and, given that it comprises
trade of intermediate goods whose price is more uncertain, the latter option
is likely to be preferred. As for MS FDI, the eect is again positive for a
similar reason. Indeed, assuming an increasing uctuation of exchange rates,
the price of exports will be surrounded by higher uncertainty, thus spurring
rms to prefer FDI. As far as NMAS FDI are concerned, following option
theory, we expect the choice to conduct FDI to be procrastinated because of
the increasing opportunity for the rm to get higher prots in the future.
This points to the existence of a negative relationship between volatility and
FDI (Campa, 1993).
As for the level of the exchange rate, the current literature usually
identies a positive relationship between local currency depreciation and
FDI (Froot and Stein, 1991; Klein and Rosengren, 1994; Barrel and Pain,
1998). In this case, it is useful to dierentiate between localisation and
internalisation determinants. As for the former, when the FDI is RS, the
eect is positive because we expect to be more dicult for the rm to import
if the exchange rate depreciates. In the case of MS FDI, an increase in the
exchange rate decreases the cost of acquiring an asset abroad and, at the
same time, decreases the nominal prot gained by the FDI activity. That is
why the eect is likely to be positive. Nevertheless, reasoning in terms of
relevant alternatives, a positive eect, mediated by exports, can arise. Indeed,
an increase in exchange rate leads to a decrease in exports, thus reducing
the number of available alternatives and hence increasing the likelihood of
FDI. As for localisation determinants instead, it is useful to dierentiate
between perfect and imperfect capital market. In the former case, the eect
is nil because of the impossibility to take advantage of internal prices; while,
in the latter, we expect a positive eect because the rm may act through
prices in order to rise nominal prots. Hence, the resulting eect is positive.
Finally, for NMAS, the eect is positive because, in the short run, the price
18of the asset the rm is trying to get access is decreasing and it is convenient
not to delay its acquisition. This last eect is the \re sale" eect identied
in the empirical literature (Blonigen, 1997).
A third stream of the empirical literature (Campa, 1993; Goldberg and
Kolstad, 1995) has shown that an increase in the expected exchange rate may
lead to a reduction of the amount of FDI currently undertaken. According
to our taxonomy, this eect will be very negative when the choice is between
trade and MS FDI given that spot contracts are the norm; when the choice
is between outsourcing and RS FDI the eect is less negative, because of the
existence of long-term contracts. As for localisation determinants, once FDI
is chosen as the relevant strategy, expected exchange rates do not impact
on the level of the FDI because, by denition, all the transfers are made
internally to the rm. This is the case for both RS and MS FDI; as regards
NMAS, it should be pointed out that the eect is negative because an
expected \re sale" eect is again likely to arise.
5.2 Institutions
As for the macro area of institutions, it can be divided in two main elds:
social and political issues, such as bureaucracy, corruption and infrastructure;
and technological environment, as issues related to intellectual property rights
(henceforth IPR).
Most of the recent literature (e.g. B enassy-Qu er e et al., 2007) points at
good institutions as the driving force of increasing FDI inows (Wei, 2000;
Globerman and Shapiro, 2002). The rst point to be considered is related to
infrastructure, which includes for example transports and ICTs. Overall, the
presence of better infrastructure positively aects the level of FDI carried out
at the rm level. However, as it can be seen in Table 2, while the total eect
of a better level of infrastructure is always positive thanks to the impact of
localisation determinants, some important dierences arise between RS and
MS FDI for what pertains to internalisation determinants. In the former
case, an increase in the level of infrastructure does not induce a rm to prefer
FDI to the relevant alternative, namely outsourcing. This happens because
both alternatives might benet from that, thus cancelling each other. In the
latter case, FDI is always preferred to the relevant alternative, i.e. exports,
because of the possibility to reap a higher market share. As for NMAS FDI,
a positive relationship is assumed, mainly because FDI is preferred to the
acquisition of core personnel if better infrastructures is present.
Then, under the heading of enforcement of law, we can nd issues such
as corruption and bureaucracy. As already mentioned, previous literature
found a positive sign concerning both the amount and location of FDI. This
is conrmed by our taxonomy in all three cases.
Instead, with respect to IPR,20 the eect is more complex. Even at a
20Despite IPR include a set of dierent instruments, such as copyright, trademark,
19theoretical level, there is no agreement on which is the best regime for IPR
in order to attract FDI (e.g. Maskus, 2000): both strong and weak IPR
regimes may encourage a rm to serve a foreign country through FDI. In case
of strong IPR, the rm is more condent that its asset will not be spread
out and FDI should therefore grow. However, being now easier to protect
the valuable asset it may also be the case that FDI is displaced by export
or licensing. Likewise, in case of weak IPR, FDI may grow because rms
now need to protect their assets through internalisation. In terms of our
classication, in case of RS FDI, we expect a mild negative eect, mainly
because the higher codiability will lead the outsource to better master the
phase of the production process of its own competency. Hence, we expect
the level of outsourcing to increase whereas that of FDI to decrease. In
case of MS FDI, the direction of the eect is less clear. If we compare FDI
to licensing, we may expect both a decreasing level of FDI due to higher
prots from license revenues and an increasing level of FDI due to the better
protection obtained in the host country market against competitors. However,
when the comparison is made between FDI and exports, an increase in the
degree of patentability will increase the level of FDI because spill-overs will
hurt less rm's prots thanks to the higher level of protection. In general,
the overall eect is dicult to disentangle even if, at a good approximation,
it can be hypothesised to be mild positive. As for NMAS, if we assume that
in the host country there is a non-transferable asset the rm is interested
in and assume further that this asset refers, for example, to a production
process that, although not entirely transferable through the market, is at
least partially patented by some local rms, then we should expect that an
increase in the degree of patentability in the host market will discourage, at
least partially, the willingness of the rm to conduct FDI.
5.3 Trade protection
As for trade protection (Belderbos, 1997; Blonigen et al., 2002), we consider
both tari and non-tari trade barriers.21
Considering RS FDI, the eect should be positive because rms, acting
on internal prices, can build a more favourable setting, thus more than
osetting the negative sign due to the taris imposed on goods' re-import.
In the case of MS, we expect a positive sign because of the tari-jumping
hypothesis: rms will invest through a foreign aliate in order to avoid the
higher price of serving the foreign market through exports.22 Instead, in the
industrial secret, and so on, here we only refer to patent because this issue covers the great
majority of the studies on the topic.
21Non-tari barriers are, for example, particular standards to be met on the characteristics
of imported goods or other \red tape" barriers. In the case of non-tari barriers the empirical
studies investigating their eect on FDI decision are very limited due data constraints.
22However, in the case of MS FDI as export platform, we should consider the fact that
exporting both nal and intermediate goods to third countries will be preferred to FDI
20case of NMAS, the eect is null because higher tari barriers do not aect
the transfer price of the resource the rm is looking for.
5.4 Localised knowledge spillovers
The last determinant we consider is related to the issue of localised knowl-
edge spillovers. This literature considers how a rm localising in a cluster
might be characterised by advantages deriving from the knowledge ability
to spillover from the neighbouring rms or other organisations (universities
and research centres) (e.g. Doring and Schnellenbach, 2006; Audretsch et al.,
2004). However, this particular location may lead to both technological and
pecuniary externality as well as to higher competition. Even though the
technology sourcing literature predicts a positive eect on the choice and the
level of FDI, which of the two eects is going to prevail is not clear.
According to our taxonomy, in the case of RS FDI a null eect will arise
because we expect the rm located in the home country to rely on the rm
that, inside the cluster, is able to produce intermediate goods better. This
means that the company has no need to invest via FDI. In the case of MS
FDI, the eect is positive because the rm has higher possibilities of rising
its productivity (through spillover eect) and therefore selling higher amount
of goods in the local market. Finally, for NMAS, the eect is again positive,
because through an FDI a rm can get more of the resource it needs and so
it can increase its productivity.
6 Conclusions
Despite FDI have been at the centre of the analysis since a long time,
economics has not yet developed a unied framework for their investigation.
Up to now, the only valuable instrument available to sail through the subject
is Dunning's (1993) taxonomy which has been extensively used in numerous
empirical works on the subject. Notwithstanding, we think that it does
not constitute a complete and trustworthy theoretical framework able to
guide the researcher through the analysis of the eects and the consequences
of FDI. In this paper, we put forward the idea that an essential point in
the study of FDI concerns the underpinning motives spurring FDI decision.
Indeed, we believe that motives should be at the core of the FDI decision
and that FDI is only but one of dierent relevant alternatives available to
grasp an opportunity arising in a foreign country. Moreover, the relationship
between motives and the set of alternatives means by which opportunity can
be seized is presented. According to that, we show how various factors shape
the dierent set of available alternatives and that, among them, what we
named internalisation determinants aect the decision for an FDI strategy.
activity.
21Table 2: FDI determinants classied by motives
Resource seeking Market seeking
Non marketable
asset seeking
Exchange
ratesa Volatility (+) (+) ({)
Exchange
rates
ID:b (=)
LD:c (+)
ID: (+)
LD: (+)
(+)
Expected
exchange
rates
ID: ({)
LD: (=)
({) ({)
Institutions Infrastructure
ID: (=)
LD: (+)
ID: (+)
LD: (+)
(+)
Law
enforcement
(+) (+)
ID: (+)
LD: (+)
Degree of
patentability
({) (+) ({)
Trade
protection
(+) (+) (=)
Localised
knowledge
spillovers
(=) (+) (+)
 Mild eect
aHost country over home country currency.
bInternalisation determinants.
cLocalisation determinants
Finally, another set of factors, namely localisation determinants, inuence
the localisation of the FDI.
On the grounds of this new logical framework, we have critically reviewed
the existing literature on the subject, pointing out how our initial concern is
actually true, namely that no comprehensive treatment of motives is present
there. For this reason, our next step has been to build up a motive-based
classication for FDI, distinguishing among three main motives: resource
seeking, market seeking and non-marketable asset seeking.
Finally, we have made use of our taxonomy by taking a closer look at
the empirical literature dealing with factors aecting FDI decision. It is the
case that empirical works has found seemingly contradictory results on the
eects of several variables on inward/outward FDI decisions. We have shown
how these contradictory outcomes can be consistently reduced thanks to the
implementation of our classication which draw the attention on motives
and on the eects that the latter have on subsequent FDI decisions.
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